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I .  Introduction 
Many organizational scholars have argued that  firm's response to 
environmental elements influences patterns of competition in the market. 
while the  outcomes of competition are generally coordinated by resource 
heterogeneity and environmental characteristics. Moreover, approaches for 
identifying embedded economic transactions propose that  social relations 
each organization has previously accumulated provide unique entrepreneurial 
opportunities tha t  are not possible otherwise (Granovetter. 1985: Burt. 
1992: Baker, 1990). I t  is because social relations channel market exchange 
and facilitate collective action both within and outside market contexts 
(Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). 
This study investigates whether firm behavior reflects the attributes of 
social structure, and how firm strategy is constrained by i ts  network 
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embeddedness. More specifically, we examine strategic alliance formation 
that  is partly constrained by the characteristics of social relations in the 
Korean telecommunications industry. 
As a part of deregulation policy, the Korean government announced to allow 
new entrants with qualifications in the industry in 1996. The government 
asked firms that wanted to enter the telecommunications market to submit 
application forms such that i t  could decide who could enter the industry. In 
response to this, a record number of firms formed consortia to meet required 
qualifications set by the government. Using the data,  we investigate whether 
social structure influences the selection of alliance partner. 
1T. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
1. Social Structure and Social Capital 
Problematic dimensions such as  uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik. 1978). 
legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan. 1977). or cooperative relations (Jarillo. 1988) 
describe organizational environment. Specially, social network analysis 
defines the  environment as  social relations among social actors, and allows 
researchers to measure specific dimensions of the environment in question 
while using observable patterns of interaction between organizations (Cook 
& Whitmeyer, 1992). 
The effect of social relations or structure on firm behavior and 
performance can be coined as  the concept of social capital. Social capital is 
one of the  constructs to describe relationships among organizations and the 
specific dimensions of the environment. Although the definitions of social 
capital vary over a wide range of studies, empirical explorations usually 
place a great emphasis on the observable patterns of social interaction. 
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Acco~.dingly, social capital is explained in terms of social relations with 
the elements of environment. That is ,  actors possessing 'a durable network' 
of relationships with members in the community are likely to develop social 
capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant. 1992: Burt. 1992. 1997). For instance. 
Bourdieu articulates social capital as  the sum of resources that  accrue to 
actors due to their social relations (Bourdieu & Wacquant. 1992). Coleman 
(1988) also deals with productive aspects of social capital, and identifies i t  
as  resources that  are available to actors in achieving their interests. 
Productive value of social capital comes from the access to resources. 
including information. Distribution of resources is frequently skewed, and 
their mobility is  not so perfect as  in competitive market. In such cases. 
some firms can make a stable access to resources by utilizing their 
relationship with others who have control over the resources. I t  is because 
mutual recognition and trust created by durable social relations lead to 
embedded transactions between them. In addition, firms expect favorable 
cooperation from others in relations when focal firms' resources are not 
sufficient for some purpose. 
2. Social Structure and F i rm Behavior 
As the open system approach indicates (Pfeffer & Salancik. 1978). 
organizations cannot survive without sufficient support from environments. 
Transaction is  not conducted impersonally: rather i t  is influenced by the 
content of social relations that  firms have with their environments. That is, 
economic transactions are frequently completed within limited participants 
because of embeddedness or network effect (Granovetter. 1985: Uzzi. 1996). 
The network effect can be ultimately expressed in terms of performance 
because social structure that  they are embedded in may influence strategic 
decisions (Pennings, Lee, & Witteloostuiin. 1998). The reciprocity of social 
relations imposes structural constraints on the range of firm behavior: 
thus,  the effects of social networks on the performance can be reduced to 
firm behavior caused by the structural constraints. 
For instance, firms having diversified relations with less cohesive others 
will have high structural autonomy and thus have ability to pursue and 
realize their interests 'without constraint from other firms' in the market 
(Burt, 1982). Moreover, firms occupying non-redundant contacts between 
others can expect abnormal returns from their monopolistic positions 
caused by information of and control over others (Burt. 1992. 1997). In 
this view, the economic consequences of social relations are not only the 
matter of absolute amount of social relations(i.e., the density of social 
capital) But i t  is also the matter of comparative content of social relations 
each firm has. In some cases, as  Burt (1982) said. 'relations that  firms do 
not have to others are as  important as  the relations they have.' 
The theoretical grounds for the relation between firm behavior and social 
capital are relevantly provided by two independent research streams- 
strategic groups (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995: McGee & Thomas. 1986) 
and status-based competition (Podolny. 1993: Podolny et  al.. 1996). First. 
firms making strategic decisions have a tendency to take others in 
relations a s  their referents when information flows through social relations 
and mutual commitment to the relations fosters trust and group norm 
between actors. Such similarity judgment produces different natures of 
strategic groups along with the barriers to replication and imitation 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas. 1995; Farjoun & Lai. 1997; McGee & Thomas. 
1986). That is, adjusting and evaluating its behavior to the group norm to 
which i t  belongs, a firm imitates others or differentiates itself from others. 
Second, firms having dissimilar status do not compete with each other in 
the short run although cooptive strategy such as  interlocking directorates 
modifies their social relations. In other words, dissimilar status leads firms 
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to explore different niches in the market. Defining status as  a perceived 
quality of a firm's product in relation to that  of i ts  competitors. Podolny 
(1993) asserts that  the market competition is quite influenced by a firm's 
s ta tus  in the  market. 
Because quality, in many cases, cannot be evaluated before consuming 
products, a firm's s ta tus  is signified in the form of a generalized reputation 
that  is judged by salient index such as  previous performance and the 
reputation of i ts  suppliers and buyers. Consequently, the market is 
stratified into sub-markets such as  high-end or low-end where firms with 
similar social capital compete more directly with one another than firms 
with dissimilar one do. 
For example, organizations can exploit direct ties to control or monitor 
others, and expect stable transactions from them on the basis of group 
norm reinforced by past experience. Organizations can also explore indirect 
ties to expand available resources, including information, and compete with 
one another in searching similar indirect ties to mobilize scarce resources. 
If interfirm relations constrain each firm behavior through cognition and 
stratification, then what relations develop group norm between firms, or 
allow some firms to share the same status? One way to approach the 
productive value of social relations(i.e.. social capital) is to classify firms, 
depending on whether or not their direct and indirect relations with others 
fall within a range of prescribed properties. 
Most measures of relations used in the social network analysis usually do 
not expound a priori qualitative aspects of relations. It is noted, however. 
that  the properties of direct, and indirect ties presuppose what relations 
are 'direct' qualitatively and quantitatively. This study employs two 
constructs, cohesion and structural equivalence on the basis of the 
following reasons: first, relations differ in the mode of communication. 
direct or symbolic: second, relations differ in the obligations assigned to 
firms in the relations. 
Constructs to measure cohesion between focal firms assume that  a group 
of firms in a specific network will share group norm and evaluative 
information when they are adjacent to each other, close enough to interact 
with each other, or have frequent interaction between them (Wasserman & 
Faust,  1994). That is, cohesion develops through direct communication and 
affiliation with group norms. 
On each actor's part, being in a cohesive subgroup means that  one is 
socially closer to another in the subgroup than to any other actors in 
different subgroups. Since the contagion by direct communication provides 
the evaluative reference to the firms within the subgroup, i t  is likely that  
imitation or isomorphism will occur among the members of cohesive 
subgroup (Galaskiewicz & Burt. 1991). 
On the other hand, the equivalence based on role theory includes 
structural equivalence, isomorphic equivalence, and regular equivalence. 
which are employed on their own assumption of what is the identical 
relation (Wasserman & Faust. 1994). That is, equivalence is maintained 
through symbolic communication and the same roles to others. The 
equivalence is an approach for classifying actors on the basis of their 
positions in networks: whether two actors in networks are equivalent or 
not can be judged by the types of relations to third parties that  each actor 
has. 
For example, two actors are, i n  a strong sense, structural equivalent with 
each other if and only if they have identical ties to and from identical 
other actors - the Euclidean distance between their respective network 
positions is 0. It  can be noted that  other weak criteria of alternative 
equivalence are widely used to produce meaningful interpretation of data. 
One of advantages of equivalence over other constructs is that  i t  considers 
indirect ties with others as  well as  direct ties simultaneously. The 
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equivalence enables researchers to absorb symbolic interactions in their 
models. 
Using structural equivalence. Mizruchi (1992) points out the similarity of 
political behavior carried out by firms. In simulation. Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf (1997) observe isomorphism between equivalent actors. Studies 
on corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz & Burt. 19911, technological 
patent (Podolny e t  a l . ,  1996). R&D (Stuart & Podolny. 1996). and the 
diffusion of poison pills (Davis, 1991) report that  clusters of equivalent 
firms show similar behavioral patterns. 
3.  Social Structure and Strategic Alliance 
Much research on strategic alliances has focused on firm capability and 
transaction cost as the driving forces leading to strategic alliances. In most 
cases, however, firms with asymmetric information still need to curb partners' 
opportunistic behavior even if potential partners have complementary 
resources for some strategic intentions. Moreover, telecommunications 
industry has been undergoing a turbulent change of the task environment 
since a dramatic acceleration of technical changes and rising costs of R&D 
compel firms slow in innovations to exit the market (Llerena & Wolff. 1994). 
Because social capital provides cognitive referent for managers and a platform 
for the status-based competition in the market, firms are likely to rely on 
social capital to ensure necessary information and normative involvement 
when both the importance and the uncertainty of decision-making are high. 
In this respect, decision-makers exclude a part of potential partners when 
they have no direct experience or have no third-party referrals to evaluate 
potential partners' capability and possibility of opportunism. Prior direct 
ties serve as  an  important source of information about the reliability and 
capability of potential partners (Gulati. 1995). Reciprocity and trust  
developed through previous interations are the crucial conduit for exchange 
relationships (Larson. 1992: Zaheer & Venkatraman. 1995).  
Since oral communication and direct observation within cohesive 
subgroups will result in asset-specific investment and diffusion of inside 
information, social relations generated by direct interaction will constitute 
reliable governance structure in the market (Chung. Singh. & Lee, 
forthcoming). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis I .  The more cohesive relations focal firms have, the more 
likely are they  to form alliance with each other. 
On the other hand, decisions or behavior by structurally equivalent firms 
in the  market will serve as  an important referent when a focal firm faces 
high uncertainty of environment and risk in investment and when the 
potential partners' resources are not the common knowledge for the 
participants in the market(i.e.. everyone does not necessarily know exactly 
what others have). 
First, potential partners' reputation in the market plays an important 
role in the firms' choice of partners. A firm's status in the market may 
affect the competition with others. Accordingly, firms have a high chance 
to cultivate social relations intentionally so that  other actors in contacts 
may support to increase or reinforce their own perceived qualities, thus 
forming alliances with other prestigious producers (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven. 1996).  Such investment will be in equilibrium to the extent 
that  there is not great difference between their reputation, because alliance 
with firms with lower reputation can dilute the  perceived quality of higher 
reputation (Podolny. 1993).  
Second. 'equivalents are likely to select each other as  alliance partners to 
avoid destructive competition. Unpredictable environment with rapid 
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technical progress does not allow firms to explore the needs of future users 
by themselves. Capabilities between equivalents tend to converge since 
firms may imitate practices conducted by their equivalents to reduce 
associated risk in investment (McGee & Thomas. 1986). Thereby. 
equivalent firms share similar roles or competitive positions in the market. 
and competition with similar capabilities can exhaust scarce resources for 
such limited purposes a s  preserving the status quo. Such competition will 
be increased when equivalents are sharing the niche in the market. 
As a result, if possible, firms that  have equivalent relations seek stable 
cooperation with each other to avoid mutually destructive competition. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. The more equivalent focal firms are, the more likely are 
they to form alliance with each other. 
IN. Methods 
Research Setting 
To test the hypotheses presented above, we choose Korean telecom- 
munications industry as  a research setting. The industry consists of firms 
involved in telecommunication service and communication equipment. The 
former includes telephone service, mobile phone service, and other value-added 
telecommunication service, whereas the latter includes computers with 
auxiliaries and communication equipment. The industry has recorded rapid 
growth last  decade, and is expected to lead national economic growth in 
years to  come. For example, sales growth of the industry in 1996 was 
estimated to 49.34 percent, and net income growth 184.24 percent. 
In the past, the industry was actually dominated by Korea Telecom, 
which was controlled and owned by the Korean government. However. 
because of the WTO agreement, barriers to domestic and foreign entrants 
in entering the industry are supposed to be removed by 1998. Although the 
demand for telecommunication service is expected to grow substantially. 
cut-throat competition will be inevitable due to the deregulation policy of 
the Korean government and free trade trends by WTO. Furthermore. 
continuous technological innovations such as  CDMA (code division multiple 
access) cause existing capabilities to be obsolete, intensifying competition 
in the market. 
Prior to opening the telecommunications industry by 1998, the Korean 
government had steadily loosened constraints on the market structure. In 
1996, the government announced to allow additional entrants in the 
industry, and recommended potential applicants to submit applications 
with required documents for the review. Since the government demanded 
rigid qualifications and the competition for the license within segments in 
the industry was supposed to be particularly keen, a number of applicant 
firms rushed to engage in consortia to meet the requirements. As a result. 
a total of 52 consortia were formed and applied for 27 segments in the 
industry. 
5. Data and  analysis 
Data. The list of participants in the consortia comes from a database and 
periodicals provided by KISDI. ETRI, and the monthly magazine of 
Management and Computer. Initially. 137 firms are compiled out of the 
database and periodicals. Among them, we exclude consortia in which only 
two firms participate, because this figure is too small to make meaningful 
interpretation. Also excluded are firms of which information about their 
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social relations and firm resources is not available. Most of them are the 
medium or small sized companies that  are not listed in the stock market. 
Final sample size is 90 firms. I t  is noted that  the database and periodicals 
report only limited numbers of firms participating in consortia because 
complete membership of participants is not made public. 
Variables. Dependent variable is used as  a binary variable to measure 
firms' choice of partners. The dependent variable is set  to 1 if two focal 
firms participate in the same consortium, 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables deal with social structure and control variables. 
Two variables measure the characteristics of social structure - structural 
equivalence and cohesion. We construct social structure of organizations on 
the basis of school ties of their top managers and banking connection. 
Although social structure can be constructed from various social relations. 
those connections are quite important in Korea culturally and 
institutionally and information on the connections is publicly available. 
Therefore, we ignore other aspects of social relations in constructing social 
structure. 
School ties are  measured 1 if two focal firms' CEOs are the same college 
alumni. 0 otherwise. Banking connection is  set  to 1 if two focal firms 
transact with the same bank a s  a lead bank. 0 otherwise. Since July 1974. 
the Act of Bank has adopted the Principal Transactions Bank System in 
which each listed company has a designated bank as  a lead bank. Such 
banks monitor designated firms' financial structure. reviewing new lending 
or existing loans, and guiding capital structure improvement plans. These 
banking institutions can play a role of a broker in important strategic 
decisions such a s  the  selection of alliance partner. Pairwise comparison 
algorithm establishes two separate 90 by 90 matrices with binary values. 
By adding the two relational matrices with equal weight, we get an 
adjacency matrix Z. 
Using the adjacency matrix, we calculate two measures of social structure 
structural equivalence and cohesion. Structural equivalence between firm i 
2 1/2 and firm j is measured by d, = ( x q = 1 , 9 0  [(zi, - zjJ2 +I(z,i - z ~ )  I 1  . 
Since smaller value of dij indicates higher structural equivalence, we 
subtract dij from the largest value among dkl, k, 1 = 1. 2, . 90. TO get dii. 
we use structural equivalence/profile similarity command in UCINET IV 
(Borgatti e t  al.. 1991). 
We construct the cohesion measure by reachability (Wasserman & Faust. 
1994), utilizing the inverse of geodesic distance between two focal firms. 
Geodesic distance between two focal firms is the length of shortest path to 
reach each other in the network. If two firms have direct ties with each 
other, for instance, geodesic distance between them is 1. If they do not 
have direct ties with each other but have direct ties with a common third 
party, i t  is 2. Since we use the inverse of geodesic distance, the larger the 
value, the  more closive the firms are. 
Control variables such as  comparative characteristics of two firms' size. 
niche, and technological capabilities are introduced in the model to control 
the effect of resource complementarity. We control for them because 
previous studies on alliance formation has indicated that  resource 
complementarity between two firms increases the possibility of their 
alliance formation (Gulati. 1995: Chung. Singh. & Lee, forthcoming). 
Firm size is measured by the average three year sales volume from 1994 
to 1996. We divide the sales volume of larger firm by that  of smaller firm 
to have firm size difference. Some studies (e.g. Sakakibara, 1997) on the 
niche overlap employ standard industry classification as  a proxy for the 
niche while others (e.g. Cool & Schendel. 1987; Sinha & Noble. 1997) 
examine the firm resource with the scope commitments such as types of 
products.'The niche is not necessarily dependent on the firm resource, yet 
indirectly reveals what kind of resource firms have since the niche is a 
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place conditioning externally firm performance. In this study. we use three 
different measures to address technological capabilities between two focal 
firms: niche overlap. R&D intensity and technological specialization. 
Using Korean Standard Industry Classification code, niche overlap 
represents whether two focal firms are in the same two-digit industry. I t  is 
coded 1 if they are in the same industry. 0 otherwise. Also introduced are 
two separate indicators of firms' relative technological capabilities absolute 
difference i n  two focal firms' R&D intensity and absolute difference in 
technological specialization. 
R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D spending to total sales. Though patent 
citation or patent portfolio is preferred in most studies, we use data on 
R&D spending due to the inaccessibility to patent information of sample 
firms (see Mowery e t  al..  1996: Poldony et  al.. 1996). Technological 
specialization, a measure for the scope commitment to telecommunications 
industry, is the proportion of telecommunication related sales to the total 
sales: such relatedness is based on the standard code by Computer & 
Communication Promotion Association of Korea. 
In addition, a business group variable is included in the model. I t  refers 
to whether two focal firms are the  affiliated companies of the same Korean 
business group, namely Chaebol. I t  has value of 1 if two focal firms are 
affiliates of the same Chaebol, 0 otherwise. Since strategies conducted by 
the subsidiaries of Chaebol are likely to be coordinated, it is necessary to 
control the influence of Chaebol. 
Analysis. We test  the hypotheses by using a choice model that  includes 
indicators of social structure and control variables as  evaluative items 
(Maddala. 1983). When the utility of each alternative is a function of 
evaluative items (Xik), the model can be P(Yi = 1) = 1/ [ 1 + exp(-Z 
bkxik)], where Yi, a state of the choice based on the difference in the  
utility between alternatives, follows logistic distribution. To estimate the 
coefficients of covariates, the study uses maximum likelihood estimation by 
using logistic regression. The number of dyads used in this study is 
reduced to [ NX (N-1)]/2, although the total number of dyads is Nx (N-1). 
because we have symmetric matrices. 
N .  Results 
Most of the firms in the final sample were established in the 1970s and 
37 percent of them are specialized in telecommunications industry in 1995. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
2.Cohesion ,567 ,231 ,051 - 
3.Structural equivalence 5.74 1.51 ,068 ,337 
4,Affiliates of the same business group ,004 ,059 ,121 ,035 ,039 
5. Niche overlap .16 .37 -.031 -013 ,064 ,042 
Variables 
1.Consortium formed 
1 6. Difference in size 1 18.68 1 66.63 1 -.042 1 -.008 1 -010 1 -.009 1 ,039 1 I I 
-- - 
7,Difference in R&D intensity .14 .73 ,047 ,002 ,041 -.008 -.062 -.028 
8.Difference in technology specialization 36.70 40.70 -.I05 ,020 -.019 ,014 ,001 ,055 -.030 
Mean 
.12 
Table 2 gives the results of logistic regression about partner selection. 
Model 1 includes variables related with firms' relative resource 
characteristics and capabilities. We add the indicators of social structure in 
successive models. In model 2,  we add structural equivalence to model 1. 
  up porting hypothesis 2,  its coefficient is positive and significant a t  0.01 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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to form alliance with each other than structurally non-equivalent ones. 
Incremental chi-square test also indicates that  the addition of structural 
equivalence significantly improves the goodness of fit. 
In model 3, we add cohesion variable to model 1. Its coefficient and 
incremental chi-square test suggest that  the closeness between two firms 
increases the likelihood of their alliance formation. In other words, firms 
that  are  closely linked through direct or indirect ties tend to ally with 
each other. When we use both structural equivalence and cohesion in 
model 4, the cohesion loses i ts  significance. The coefficient is significant a t  
only 0.06 level. Compared with structural equivalence, cohesion has less 
Table 2. Parameter Estimates for Logit Model in the Choice of Partners 
specialization 
Difference in R&D intensity 
Aftiliates of the same business 
group 





L66) 1 (.664) 1 (.661) 1 (.665) 
x 2  test 
N 





' p ( .05 
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4005 
Versus Model 2 
x2=3.5 
4005 
influence on the choice of alliance partners. 
Results also indicate that  firms' relative resources are important alliance 
drivers. The positive coefficient of niche overlap suggests that  firms in the 
same industry tend to ally with each other. The negative coefficient of 
difference in technology specialization indicates that  firms' with similar 
specialization in telecommunications industry tend to participate in the 
same consortium. Business group variable has a significant and negative 
coefficient, suggesting that  firms in the same business group tend not to 
participate in the same consortium. The result implies that  Chaebols tried 
to diversify into varying segments of telecommunications industry and to 
spread project-risk by forming many different consortia through their 
affiliated firms. 
V . Discussion and Conclusions 
Based on the data about consortium formation to enter telecommunications 
industry in Korea, this study tests the effect of social structure on the 
selection of alliance partners. Results suggest that  strategic behaviors 
occurred during consortium formation reflects social structure in which firms 
are embedded. The study reports that structurally equivalent firms are more 
likely to form alliance with each other than firms within cohesive subgroups. 
Previous studies on alliance formation have emphasized the importance of 
relative resources profiles in selecting alliance partners. Only recently, the 
role of social structure in the choice of alliance partners is recognized. 
However recent studies on the social structure have considered cohesion as  
a driver of alliance formation (Gulati. 1995: Chung. Singh. & Lee. 
forthcoming). Those studies show that firms having direct ties with each 
other or indirect ties through common third parties tend to ally with each 
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other. 
This study shows that  not only cohesion but also structural equivalence 
facilitates alliance formation. In other words, structurally equivalent firms 
tend to ally with each other. Then why do structurally equivalent firms 
ally with each other? One of the possible reasons is that  structurally 
equivalent firms tend to compete with one another and thus their alliance 
formation can reduce the degree of competition. 
This study implies that  strategic alliance can be used either to increase 
the utilization of slack resources or to reduce competition. To increase the 
utilization of slack resources. firms may consider resources complementarity 
in selecting alliance partner. When the complementarity is important, 
cohesion facilitates alliance formation since firms are more concerned with 
information sharing and curbing opportunistic behaviors of partners. When 
alliance is formed to reduce the degree of competition and focal firms share 
their niche in the  market, however, structural equivalence rather than 
cohesion might be more important. 
This study has some limitations because i t  constructs social networks 
with only two kinds of relationships, although those social structural 
variables have significant effects on alliance. Future research can 
investigate what kinds of relationships are more salient and under what 
conditions structural equivalence is more important than cohesion in 
forming alliance. 
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This study investigates the effect of social structure on the selection of 
alliance partners in the Korean telecommunications industry. We collected 
data about the consortia formation of Korean firms for entering 
telecommunications industry in 1996 and constructed social structure of 
Korean firms on the basis of CEOs school ties and sharing of lead banks. 
Results of logistic analysis suggest that  the social structure significantly 
influences the  selection of alliance partners. Limitations and future 
research directions are discussed. 
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